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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172675 **30 NOVEMBER 1960** I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet officials apparently making concerted effort to lay groundwork for return to high-level US-Soviet negotiations. Soviet and Chinese leaders reportedly have engaged in bitter exchanges at Moscow world Communist meeting. II. ASIA-AFRICA Japanese shipyards to provide USSR with nine ships, including six tankers. Congo--Lumumba supporters apparently seeking material aid from Communist bloc countries; Europeans in Orientale Province threatened with expulsion. (5) The situation in Laos. III. THE WEST Haiti--Duvalier regime follows up declaration of martial law with shake-up of top military and economic officials; attempt to overthrow President may follow. (6)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 November 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: Khrushchev and other high Soviet officials have used recent private conversations with Ambassador Thompson to emphasize their desire for an improvement in US-Soviet relations. These overtures appear to be a part of a concerted effort, which began last September with Khrushchev's talks in New York with Prime Minister Macmillan. to lay the groundwork for a return to high-level negotiations after the new US administration is installed, and at the same time to place the onus on the US for any failure to engage in negotiations. Khrushchev told Ambassador Thompson on 24 November that he hopes to achieve a situation of real friendship with the US and sought to create an impression of Soviet flexibility in new negotiations for a Berlin settlement. These gestures take on added significance in view of the protracted discussions in Moscow dealing with Sino-Soviet differences and suggest that Khrushchev continues to disregard Peiping's arguments that his tactics vis-a-vis the West are detrimental to Chinese interests. (Page 1)

USSR-China: As the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders ends its third week of discussions, Soviet and Chief Lark nese leaders continue to express their differences publicly.

At a reception in Moscow for Finnish President Kekkonen on P1; all of 24 November, the Chinese ambassador was conspicuously os- P5 2, 4, 45 tracized, with only the Albanian and Bulgarian ambassadors speaking to him. Both People's Daily and Pravda are engaged in almost daily editorial disagreements.

between the Russians and Chinese have taken place at the meetings. (Page 3)

i

TOP SECRET

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japan-USSR: Japanese shipyards will provide the Soviet Union with four additional tankers of 30,000-35,000 dead-weight tons each under contracts already signed or about to be concluded as part of a program which will supply nine ships totaling 256,000 dead-weight tons and costing over \$45,000,000. Of this total, two tankers of 40,000 tons each have already been purchased by the USSR. The Japanese shipbuilding industry is short of new ship orders and has been eager for Soviet contracts in the hope of becoming a major supplier of ships for an expanded Soviet merchant fleet. The sale of these ships also will help reduce the Japanese deficit in trade with the USSR. The Japanese Foreign Ministry told the American Embassy on 29 November that it is not possible for the Japanese Government to control or cancel contracts for tankers made under the existing trade agreement.

Congo: Two recent reports suggest that Lumumba's supporters in Stanleyville are presently seeking aid--possibly including arms--from one or more Communist bloc nations.

a Lumumba emissary contacted the Soviet ambassador to Greece in mid-November concerning an unidentified "shipment" scheduled to transit the UAR and Sudan, presumably en route to Orientale Province

he was going "to certain Eastern bloc countries in his capacity as deputy leader of the Congo National Movement in Orientale Province."

In an order of 28 November, the Congolese district commissioner in Stanleyville instructed all police posts in Orientale Province that any European expressing anti-Lumumba sentiments would be expelled. The present whereabouts of Lumumba remains unknown.

30 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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Laos: Souvanna Phouma has given assurances to the British and Australian envoys that he will not order an attack on Luang Prabang unless forced to do so or unless the negotiations shortly to be undertaken in Savannakhet between General Phoumi and a National Assembly delegation fail. Souvanna's temporization has given the pro-Phoumi Luang Prabang garrison time to organize its defenses, which the garrison commander now considers adequate. five Soviet transport aircraft are now en route from the USSR to Hanoi. The cargo of these aircraft is unknown, but the planes themselves represent a significant potential airlift capacity. *Meanwhile, Phoumi began an offensive on 28 November purportedly to clean out the area south of the Ca Dinh river 100 miles east of Vientiane. If successful, however, Phoumi apparently hopes to cross the river and engage Vientiane forces to the north. (Page 5)	no
III. THE WEST	
*Haiti: The Duvalier regime has followed up its declaration of martial law on 22 November with a sudden shake-up of top military and economic officials and with intensified repression of its opponents ranging from pro-Communist to pro-clerical groups. The police excesses and the alienation of the church following the 24 November summary expulsion of the archbishop have increased and widened anti-Duvalier feeling which was already strong in the capital. Although the government appears at the moment to be controlling the situation, elements within the government and the army may seek to capitalize on the President's growing unpopularity by attempting his overthrow.	01
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30 Nov 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Khrushchev Emphasizes Desire for Improved Relations With US

/ Khrushchev and other high Soviet officials have used recent private conversations with Ambassador Thompson to emphasize their desire for an improvement in US-Soviet relations. The Soviet premier took the ambassador aside at the Soviet reception for Finland's President Kekkonen on 24 November and said that he hoped not only to improve relations but to achieve real friendship. On another occasion a similar expression of optimism was made by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who indicated satisfaction with Senator Kennedy's election but expressed concern over press reports that the new US administration's first step would be an increase in military expenditures. He urged the ambassador to endeavor to convince the President-elect that the USSR was not seeking to dominate the world by force or other means and that both sides should seek to establish an atmosphere of trust and confidence.

Other Soviet officials have sought to promote this general line. The chief of the American section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry predicted to Thompson that relations would soon improve. The minister for higher education made a similar forecast and called for broadening the student exchange program. The Foreign Ministry official also hinted that some move on the release of the RB-47 crew members might be forthcoming, provided the issue could be settled in the proper 'framework.'

Khrushchev raised the Berlin problem and sought to create an impression of flexibility in any future negotiations. He indicated that the USSR was prepared for a "quiet exploration" of the issue and would maintain an open mind on a solution which would protect US prestige. He offered to consider?

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any guarantees for a settlement--such as one by the United Nations--but insisted on Moscow's fundamental condition that any solution must recognize the existence of two German states.

These overtures are apparently part of a concerted effort, which opened last September with Khrushchev's talks in New York with Prime Minister Macmillan, to lay the groundwork for a return to high-level negotiations after the new US administration is installed, and at the same time to place the onus on the United States for any failure to engage in negotiations. Khrushchev, for example, also sought out the French ambassador at the 24 November reception and expressed a desire for good relations with both Washington and Paris.

Such gestures take on added significance in view of the protracted discussion in Moscow dealing with Sino-Soviet differences and suggest that Khrushchev continues to disregard Peiping's arguments that his tactics vis-a-vis the West are detrimental to Chinese interests. Khrushchev apparently is seeking to underscore his determination to maintain his "peaceful coexistence" strategy and to reject any concessions to Chinese demands which would imply even a partial repudiation of his policy toward the West over the past three years.

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Cold Atmosphere Surrounds Moscow Meetings

As the Moscow conferen	ce of world Communist lead-
ers ends its third week of dia	scussions, Soviet and Chinese
leaders continue to express	their differences publicly, and
disagreements at the	meetings are reflected in the
strained atmosphere noted in	Moscow.
	Northern Control

At a reception in Moscow for Finnish President Kekkonen on 24 November the Chinese ambassador was conspicuously ostracized by Soviet bloc representatives, with only the Albanian and Bulgarian ambassadors and minor Soviet officials speaking to him. In contrast, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and other top Soviet leaders made a point of seeking out Ambassador Thompson for conversation. In reply to Ambassador Thompson's remark that he hoped in the last ten days the Soviet premier "had gotten in some good blows for peace," Khrushchev smiled and said he had, adding that "nuclear war was unthinkable."

Khrushchev's message to the Chinese leaders thanking them for their October revolution greetings, while stressing the need for bloc unity, was significantly cooler than those of earlier years. Both People's Daily and Pravda in the last few days have continued their editorial disagreements, with Peiping emphasizing the need for continuous "struggle against imperialism-colonialism" and Moscow warning of the danger of "dogmatism and sectarianism." The People's Daily editorial for 27 November opened with Mao's dictum that "nothing reactionary will topple unless you strike it down," and Pravda on the same day hailed Engels' "passionate and uncompromising struggle... against revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism..."

there have been bitter exchanges between the Soviet and Chinese delegates. He reports that a committee of 26 countries had prepared a resolution for adoption at the meeting three?

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<u></u>	weeks before the conference started. Since the resolution was based on Soviet positions, the Chinese refused to accept it and claimed that there can be no equality if the international Communist movement is directed by one party.
	The Chinese asserted that their position was right and that they were determined to follow it. The Chinese insisted: "Let history be the judge." On 14 November they submitted a report which reiterated views they expressed at Bucharest in June 1960 and which held that the Soviet Union was "destroying international solidarity and reinforcing revisionism." Liu Shao-chi
	gave a four-hour speech at the conference on 22 November in which he attacked Khrushchev personally, as had the Chinese delegate at the Bucharest conference in June 1960.
	Although the atmosphere surrounding the meeting is strained, the length of the talks suggests that the USSR, while unwilling to accept any of the Chinese positions, is also unwilling to abandon its efforts to find language for a declaration of "unity" which would be acceptable to the Chinese. Both sides continue to support the declaration, worked out in 1957 and reaffirmed at Bucharest, which is quoted by each side in support of its own views. No real resolution of the differences appears likely, however, and the disagreements can be expected to continue and deepen.

The Situation in Lac

Premier Souvanna Phouma has given assurances

not order an attack on Luang Prabang unless 'forced to do so'' or unless the National Assembly delegation led by former Premier Tiao Somsanith fails in its attempt to negotiate a settlement with General Phoumi. The Somsanith delegation

There have been no reports of further movement by the troops scheduled to participate in the attack on Luang Prabang; they apparently remain for the most part in the Muong Kassy area, about 55 miles south of Luang Prabang on the road to Vientiane. Souvanna's temporization in ordering the attack has given the pro-Phoumi Luang Prabang garrision time to organize its defenses. The commander, General Boun Leut, is apparently satisfied that he possesses adequate strength to hold the town, and in addition is reportedly bringing in about 300 Meo tribesmen to ambush the Vientiane forces if they move further up the Vientiane - Luang Prabang road.

flew to Savannakhet for the talks with Phoumi on 29 November.7

Another factor casting doubt on Vientiane's ability to take Luang Prabang is the reported sympathy for Savannakhet of the commander of one of three columns which would take part in any attack. In view of these considerations, Souvanna may find some other pretext for further postponing the attack, if the Somsanith delegation meets with its expected failure.

Souvanna is reportedly concerned lest Somsanith and the six other deputies who accompanied him may defect to Phoumi or be forced under duress to lend themselves to maneuvers to secure a no-confidence vote in the assembly against the ?

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titites of relie for Souvanna. en route from	ring to follow up it ef supplies to Laos Five Soviet IL-14 Irkutsk to Hanoi v Laos as proferred	as a gesture of it 4 transport aircra via Peiping may be	all quan- s support ft now carrying
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